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INTRODUCTION
The role of women in our society is shaped in significant part by
our legal system, and the legal rights recognized by our courts. When
the government creates laws based on traditional notions of what
women's roles should be, and the Supreme Court upholds such laws,
such stereotypes are legitimized, making it more difficult for women
to act in non-traditional roles. One of the most firmly-rooted gender
stereotypes in our society is that of the ideal mother. Not surpris-
ingly, this stereotype can most seriously impede women's advance-
ment in society.' Recently, the Supreme Court addressed concepts of
motherhood in the context of a citizenship case, Nguyen v. INS. In
that case, it was argued that the statute governing the process for
naturalized citizenship of children born to a citizen father and non-
citizen mother violated the guarantees of the Equal Protection
Clause.
In this paper, I will examine the Nguyen decision; specifically, I will
look at the language used in the opinion to demonstrate that the tra-
ditional ideas of women's proper roles have continued to subtly and
not so subtly influence our legal system's highest court. I will then
discuss the possible implications of "motherhood" language such as
that used by the Nguyen Court. In particular, I will explore the poten-
tially adverse effects of presuming that, because a woman is a mother
in the biological sense, she is also a mother in the sociological sense.
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank Kerry
Abrams, Debra Chopp, and John Gould.
I Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding Citizens and
Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 564 (2000) ("[T]he
good mother stereotype impedes the progress of women. Despite the growing necessity and
desire of women to work outside the home, women continue to be regarded as the primary
caretakers.") (citations omitted).
2 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
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I will also address the concept of the "ideal mother" and the argu-
ments put forth by several feminist theorists that images of the ideal
mother can harm women because they can be used to justify denying
women reproductive freedoms and childrearing support. Because
women who are biological mothers are presumed to be sociological
mothers, they are expected to strive to meet society's ideological
standards of motherhood; those who do not or cannot attain such
goals are left to internalize their failure, or worse. Finally, I will argue
that a woman could claim that Section 1409(a) (4), the statute at issue
in Nguyen, violates her "rights" because the statute is based on "ar-
chaic and stereotypic notions"' of gender roles and not on biological
classification alone.
It is important to establish what I mean when I refer to the socio-
logical role of mother, as opposed to the biological role of mother. I
rely in part on the distinction Adrienne Rich makes in her book Of
Woman Born. The biological role of mother is a function of a
woman's body and her ability to give birth. Rich views the sociologi-
cal role of motherhood as a restrictive institution established to per-
petuate a social system designed by men.5 For the purposes of this
paper, however, the sociological role of mother is meant to refer to
the idea that caregiving and childrearing are not necessarily instinc-
tual, but are learned cultural experiences separate from the experi-
ence of pregnancy and birth.6 The details of this distinction are fur-
ther outlined in Part III.
I. NGUYEN v. INS
The facts leading up to Nguyen are as follows. Tuan Anh Nguyen,
the son of an American citizen father and a non-citizen mother, was
found guilty on criminal charges. The United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS") then initiated deportation pro-
ceedings against Nguyen, claiming that he was an alien; an immigra-
tion judge found him deportable. On appeal to the Board of Immi-
3 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
4 ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN 13 (1976) (distinguishing the two meanings of mother-
hood).
5Id.
6 See id. at 12 (theorizing that there are two parts to motherhood: the first being the experi-
ence of pregnancy and birth; the second, learning to nurture). But see Katharine K. Baker, Biol-
ogy for Feminists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805, 808-09 (2000) (suggesting that because, biologically
speaking, women invest more resources in the creation of offspring, and because there will al-
ways be some uncertainty for a man as to whether the child is his own, women are more likely to
invest in caretaking then men).
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gration of Appeals, the Board rejected Nguyen's claim that he was a
United States citizen because he had failed to comply with 8 U.S.C. §
1409(a), a statute establishing citizenship requirements for individu-
als born abroad out of wedlock to a citizen father and noncitizen
mother. Together with his citizen father Joseph Boulais, Nguyen ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that Sec-
tion 1409 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
because it provided different rules for citizenship depending upon
the gender of the parent with American citizenship. Specifically,
Section 1409(a) requires more affirmative steps to be taken to obtain
citizenship when the citizen parent is the father than when the citizen
parent is the mother.' The Fifth Circuit rejected the constitutional
claims of Nguyen and Boulais, and the case went before the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that Section 1409(a)
does not violate the equal protection provisions of the Constitution.
While acknowledging that the gender classifications of Section 1409
require heightened scrutiny, the Court concluded that the federal
government had met this standard.9 In its discussion of important
governmental interests furthered by Section 1409(a) (4), the majority
noted that one such interest was ensuring that "the child and the citi-
zen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to de-
velop ... a relationship.., that consists of the real, everyday ties that
provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn,
the United States."'" The Court noted that in the case of the citizen
mother and child born overseas, "the opportunity for a meaningful
relationship inheres in the very event of birth, an event so often criti-
cal to our constitutional and statutory understandings of citizen-
7 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58.
8 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) states that, for children born out of wedlock, citizenship will be con-
ferred to such a person born to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother if: (1) a blood relation-
ship between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the
father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's birth; (3) the father
(unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the
person reaches the age of 18 years; and (4) while the person is under the age of 18 years, (a)
the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile, (b) the father
acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or (c) the paternity of the person is
established by adjudication of a competent court. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (4) (2002).
9 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60 ("For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection
scrutiny, it must be established 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives.'") (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996)). (further citations omitted).
0 Id., 533 U.S. at 64-65.
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ship."'1  It is true that with respect to Section 1409, the "event of
birth" is the basis for transmitting citizenship from a citizen mother
to her child." However, due to what the Court labels "biological in-
evitability," unwed fathers do not have the same opportunity: the
nine months that lapse between conception and birth mean that it is
not always certain a father will know a child was conceived or that a
mother will know the father's identity. "
Essential to the majority's contention that there was no equal pro-
tection violation in Nguyen is the principle that differential treatment
based on gender is not inherently discriminatory. The majority relies
on language in United States v. Virginia stating that "[p] hysical differ-
ences between men and women... are endunng to support its
conclusion that the government can base its differential treatment of
citizen fathers and citizen mothers upon the unique biological role of
women in childbearing. The Court states that:
There is nothing irrational or improper in the recognition that at the
moment of birth-a critical event in the statutory scheme and in the
whole tradition of citizenship law-the mother's knowledge of the child
and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way not guaran-
teed in the case of the unwed father. This is not a stereotype.
Reliance on gender stereotypes as the actual justification for dis-
crimination is impermissible,' but reliance on physical or biological
differences between men and women does not in itself elicit height-
ened equal protection scrutiny in the Court's view.
It is not clear, however, that the majority, and indeed the govern-
ment, were not in fact relying on gender stereotypes in enacting Sec-
tion 1409. In her dissent in Nguyen, Justice O'Connor argues persua-
sively that the majority (and the government) illogically premises its
I Id. at 65.
12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) ("[A] person born outside the United States and out of wedlock
shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had
nationality of the United States at the time of such person's birth ...
13 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65.
14 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
15 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).
16 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725 (noting that tests for gender-based classifications must be "applied
free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females").
17 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that a state insurance program that
excludes the physical condition of pregnancy from its list of compensable disabilities does not
necessarily mean that it is an invalid sex-based classification). As Geduldig states,
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to ef-
fect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers
are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation
such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
Id. at 496-497, n.20.
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opinion upholding the statute on the biological differences between
the sexes, and fails to consider whether the sex-based classification
within the statute is merely an impermissible proxy for a more ger-
mane basis for classification.' Examining the history of the citizen-
ship and custody laws for nonmarital children born overseas,
O'Connor concludes that the gender classification in Section 1409
goes beyond biological differences; its differential treatment is un-
necessary given the purported governmental goals for the statute,
such as the goal of allowing for an "opportunity for a relationship"
between the citizen parent and child.9 In disputing this justification
for the statute's differential treatment, she states:
[T] he idea that a mother's presence at birth supplies adequate assurance
of an opportunity to develop a relationship while a father's presence at
birth does not would appear to rest only on an overbroad sex-based gen-
eralization. A mother may not have an opportunity for a relationship if
the child is removed from his or her mother on account of alleged abuse
or neglect, or if the child and mother are separated by tragedy, such as
disaster or war, of the sort apparently present in this case. There is no
reason, other than stereotype, to say that fathers who are present at birth
lack an opportunity for a relationship on similar terms. The "[p]hysical
differences between men and women".., do not justify § 1409(a) (4)'s
discrimination.2"
O'Connor concludes that using the goal of a parental relationship for
upholding Section 1409(a) (4) "finds support not in biological differ-
ences but instead in a stereotype--i.e., 'the generalization that mothers
are significantly more likely than fathers ... to develop caring rela-
tionships with their children.'' Because, as previously noted, sex-
based classifications based on "archaic and stereotypic notions of
women" are impermissible,2 O'Connor reasons that it is impermissi-
ble for the majority to use such a classification as a justification for
upholding the statute.
Although Nguyen concerns the equal protection rights of a citizen
father, its reasoning has negative implications for women as well.
O'Connor notes that the Court's decision could have a lasting impact
on preconceived ideas of gender roles: "Sex-based generalizations
both reflect and reinforce 'fixed notions concerning the roles and
is Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (referring to the standard as laid out in
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)).
19 Id. at 86-87.
20 Id. at 86-87 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533) (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 88-89 (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 482-83 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing)) (emphasis added).
22 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
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abilities of males and females."'23 Thus, according to O'Connor, in
upholding the use of a sex-based generalization to justify the differ-
ential treatment outlined in Section 1409, the majority's opinion not
only perpetuates the myth that men are not as available to establish
relationships with their children as women are,24 but also does a dis-
service to women and societal perception of their roles as well. Fol-
lowing Congress' lead in enacting Section 1409, the majority reasons
that knowledge of one's own pregnancy and the event of birth itself is
enough to establish "an opportunity" for a mother-child relation-
ship.2  That Congress requires additional affirmative steps to be
taken by a citizen father (via Section 1409(a) (4)) is proof that the
legislature did not believe that knowledge of pregnancy and presence
at birth was enough in itself to establish an opportunity for a father-
child relationship. This disparate reasoning should immediately
sound a warning, and one must examine why such factors are enough
to establish an opportunity to bond with a child for a citizen mother
but not a citizen father.
Furthermore, the necessity of having such a law on the books is
questionable. O'Connor takes the majority to task for not seriously
considering the option of a gender-neutral citizenship requirement.
She notes that instead of the gender-biased requirements outlined in
Section 1409(a) (4), Congress could have used a gender-neutral re-
quirement for presence at or knowledge of the birth of the child in
question to fulfill its interest in allowing for an "opportunity for a re-
lationship" between citizen parent and child. 6 Indeed, the majority's
justification for not requiring a gender-neutral statute is arguably in-
sufficient; the Court notes that although Congress could have ex-
cused compliance with the formal requirements of Section
1409(a)(4) when an actual father-child relationship existed, thus
nearing gender-neutrality in the implementation of the statute, the
intrusiveness of the inquiry and difficulties of proof were perhaps too
much of a burden on the government.27 O'Connor states that this
23 533 U.S. at 74 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
24 Id. at 89. Indeed, Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, implies that a disturbing stereotype of
men may also have been used to justify the differential treatment of Section 1409. Referring to
the majority's recitation of statistics of the number of (predominantly male) military personnel
situated overseas and the frequency of overseas travel by (presumably male) Americans as proof
that, in many cases, a man may not be aware of the existence of his child nor may have an op-
portunity to bond with that child, O'Connor states: "The majority's discussion may itself simply
reflect the stereotype of male irresponsibility that is no more a basis for the validity of the classi-
fication than are stereotypes about the 'traditional' behavior patterns in women." Id. at 94.
Id. at 65.
26 Id. at 86 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 69.
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explanation is essentially based on administrative convenience. 2  Not
only has administrative convenience been repeatedly rejected as
grounds for allowing sex-based discrimination, O'Connor claims, but
it is questionable whether there would be any inconvenience in re-
quiring the government to use a gender-neutral statute.
Because the majority believes that a biological event-birth-is a
significant factor in establishing an opportunity for parent-child rela-
tionships, any claims of gender discrimination can be readily dis-
missed. As mentioned earlier, disparate treatment correlating to
physical differences between men and women has not been held sus-
pect under the Equal Protection Clause. However, as the Nguyen dis-
sent and Nguyen's own arguments imply,29 it is my contention that
the majority of the Court and Congress do not rely on the event of
birth as a physiological occurrence. They instead rely on gender
stereotypes that are implicit in American society's perceptions of
birth and parenting. Namely, I believe that the Supreme Court in
Nguyen and in earlier family law cases subtly but effectively reinforces
the stereotype that a woman becomes a mother in both the legal and
socialized sense upon the event of birth whereas a man does not be-
come a father until he elects to do so. As with any stereotype, these
assumptions that motherhood-in the sense of caregiving-is a bio-
logical fact and not a sociological construction harm women and im-
pede their ability to fully participate as citizens in this country. Addi-
tionally, as I will address later, because it is men who control the
image of motherhood, the assumption that caregiving and nurturing
are biological (and thus natural) is particularly damaging to women.
Nguyen is not the first time that preconceived notions of mother-
hood and mothering have infiltrated a Supreme Court opinion, nor
is it an isolated example from recent decisions of the Court, as evi-
denced by language in the next Part of my paper. Instead, the major-
ity opinion in Nguyen illustrates the pervasiveness of gender stereo-
types and their continual presence in our legal system.
II. GENDER STEREOTYPING IN OTHER SUPREME COURT CASES
Language in several Supreme Court cases illustrates that the
Court and its Justices are not impervious to the gender stereotypes
28 Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
29 See Brief for Petitioners at 16, INS v. Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) ("As a
matter of biology, a mother may be presumed to know of a child's existence at the time of birth.
But knowledge that one is a parent, no matter how it is acquired, does not guarantee a relation-
ship with one's child.").
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that pervade our society. In Stanley v. Illinois," for instance, an un-
married father argued that he was entitled under the Due Process
Clause to a hearing to determine his fitness as a parent before the
state took his children away from him. The Supreme Court agreed
with the father's claim, noting that "[t]he Court has frequently em-
phasized the importance of the family."'" However, comments made
by Chief Justice Burger in a dissent revealed what law professor June
Carbone later labeled the ChiefJustice's "biological determinism:
3 2
I believe that a State is fully justified in concluding, on the basis of com-
mon human experience, that the biological role of the mother in carry-
ing and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds between her and the
child than the bonds resulting from the male's often casual encounter.
This view is reinforced by the observable fact that most unwed mothers
exhibit a concern for their offspring either permanently or at least until
they are safely placed for adoption, while unwed fathers rarely burden ei-
ther the mother or the child with their attentions or loyalties. Centuries
of human experience buttress this view of the realities of human condi-
tions and suggest that unwed mothers of illegitimate children are gener-
ally more dependable protectors of their children than are unwed fa-
thers."
From this statement, one may conclude that Burger believed moth-
erhood was not a function of socialization but rather one solely of bi-
ology. He was not alone in this belief; Justice Blackmun, known for
his opinions advocating the rights of women, signed onto Chief Jus-
tice Burger's dissent in Stanley. That Blackmun joined Burger may be
evidence that it was generally accepted that such a theory of mother-
hood appeared to have no harmful effect upon women's rights. But
the theory is riddled with faults; for instance, the "proof" that Burger
puts forth to support the "biological determinism" theory-namely,
the "observable fact" that unwed mothers express more concern for
their children than fathers, as well as "centuries of human experi-
ence" reinforcing such facts-is not necessarily conclusory. In fact,
this theory can be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy; because women
are socialized to be mothers, they are expected to take on the respon-
sibilities assigned to this role, and thus exhibit behavior consistent
with this expectation. This alternative view of Burger's "proof' is
supported by an understanding of custody history in America. In
Nguyen, Justice O'Connor notes in her dissent that traditionally, laws
30 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
31 Id. at 651.
32 June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New Model of Parental Part-
nership, 39SANTA CLARAL. REV. 1091, 1130 (1999).
s3 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665-66 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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were established recognizing mothers as the "natural guardians" of
nonmarital children, thus leaving women with the responsibility of
caring for these children and, more significantly, relieving men of
that same responsibility.
Furthermore, in Caban v. Mohammed, a father who had had joint
custody of his two children from the time of their birth challenged
the validity of an order allowing the children's mother's new husband
to adopt the children. The Supreme Court upheld the father's claim
that his equal protection rights were violated. The majority, however,
did not go so far as to extract socialized parental roles from biological
functions, commenting that even if unwed mothers as a class were in
fact closer to their children at birth than unwed fathers, such a gen-
eralization about parent-child relations became "less acceptable as a
basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child increased."
3 6
The Court thus accepted the possibility that women exhibited
stronger social ties to their children at birth due to their biological
function, but that over the passage of time such ties could also de-
velop between fathers and their children. Even when striking down
impermissible gender-based generalizations in statutes, the Court re-
inforced the stereotype that women are natural caretakers and there-
fore assume the role of mother when they give birth.
In his dissent in Caban, Justice Stewart noted an element of dis-
cord between parental rights and biology, stating that "Parental rights
do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between
parent and child. They require relationships more enduring."7 He
then went on to say that "[t]he mother carries and bears the child,
and in this sense her parental relationship is clear."38 Even though
Stewart observed a problem with establishing parental rights solely on
biological ties, his latter statement seems to imply that a woman's bio-
logical ties give clear support to her parental ties to the child, thus
agreeing in this sense with the majority's view of biology and parent-
ing with respect to women.
Lehr v. Robertson9 was yet another case dealing with the rights of
unwed fathers. There, the Supreme Court upheld a New York state
statute establishing a "putative father registry," with which a man reg-
isters to demonstrate his intent to claim paternity of a nonmarital
.14 533 U.S. at 92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
35 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
36 Id. at 389.
37 Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38 Id.
39 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
May 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONS77TUTIONAL LAV W
child and thereafter is entitled to receive notice of any adoption pro-
ceedings concerning the child. The Court reasoned that if the natu-
ral father of a nonmarital child fails to take the opportunity to de-
velop a relationship with his child, the Constitution will not compel
the state to listen to the father's opinion on what is best for the
child." Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens remarked on the sig-
nificance of familial ties in our society: "The intangible fibers that
connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven
throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength,
beauty, and flexibility., 4 1 "But," he stated, "the mere existence of bio-
logical link [between parent and child] does not merit equivalent
constitutional protection."42 This would seem to imply that Stevens
distinguished between the socialized roles of parents and the biologi-
cal roles of men and women. However, in Miller v. Albright,43 a later
case that perhaps foreshadowed the outcome of Nguyen, Stevens ech-
oed the sentiment of previous Justices that motherhood, in the socio-
logical sense, is inherent in pregnancy and birth.
The facts of Miller were similar to those of Nguyen; petitioners
claimed that Section 1409(a)(4)'s requirement that children born
abroad and out of wedlock to citizen fathers but not to citizen moth-
ers obtain formal proof of paternity by age eighteen violated the Fifth
Amendment. In upholding the statute against claims of sex-based
discrimination,44 Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that the sex
of the citizen parent alone did not determine whether the child was a
citizen under the statute. Instead, an "event" created the legal rela-
tionship between the parent and child, the event being "the birth it-
self for citizen mothers, but post-birth conduct for citizen fathers and
their offspring."45 While this statement can perhaps be seen as a reit-
eration by Stevens of the government's use of birth as a basis for
transmitting citizenship, and not an example of how the Court itself
has been influenced by stereotypes of motherhood, it is clear that the
majority perceives the sex-based differential treatment of Section
1409 as a biological classification. As mentioned earlier in my discus-
sion of Nguyen, once the Court can structure its argument on an exist-
ing physical difference, such as birth, then it is almost inevitable that
any equal protection sex discrimination claims will fail. The Miller
40 Id. at 263-64.
41 Id. at 256.
42 Id. at 261.
43 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
44 Petitioners had raised claims that Section 1409 was based on a "breadwinning" stereotype
of men and a "caretaker" stereotype of women. See id. at 443.
45 Id. at 443.
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opinion provides further proof that the statute is not insinuating
women are natural caretakers; the statute, the Court writes, does not
"assume that all mothers of illegitimate children will necessarily have
a closer relationship with their children than will fathers." However,
[The statute] does assume that all of them will be present at the event
that transmits their citizenship to the child, that hospital records and
birth certificates will normally make a further acknowledgment and for-
mal proof of parentage unnecessary, and that their initial custody will at
least give them the opportunity to develop a caring relationship with the
child. 6
At first glance, the Court's emphasis on the link between citizenship
and biological function seems logical and even reasonable. However,
as Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent in Miller, historical treatment
of children born abroad to American citizens "counsels skeptical ex-
amination" of the government's justification for differential treat-
ment based on sex; namely, the "close connection of mother to child,
in contrast to the distant or fleeting father-child link."47 Analyzing
this "biological" justification for differential treatment in light of the
treatment of parenthood in American history,4 Ginsburg remarks
that "[f] or most of our Nation's past, Congress demonstrated no high
regard or respect for the mother-child affiliation,"49 implying that the
governmental interest cited is not the true purpose behind Section
1409. Ginsburg makes it clear in her dissent that she believes Section
1409 rests on the generalization that mothers are responsible for
children born out of wedlock, whereas fathers ordinarily are not.'°
Her dissent demands further inquiry into whether the biological clas-
sification explained in the majority opinion is not itself tangled in
stereotypical views of men and women.
The influence of gender stereotypes is not limited to cases con-
cerning citizenship. Justice O'Connor, who points out the impact of
relying on gender stereotypes in her dissent in Nguyen, takes a differ-
ent view in her opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. There,
O'Connor describes the physical and emotional pain that accompa-
nies childbirth and motherhood, and the fact that "these sacrifices
have from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman
with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the
46 Id. at 444.
47 Id. at 468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48 For a detailed history of citizenship and Section 1409, see Kristin Collins, Note, When Fa-
thers' Rights are Mothers' Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J.
1669 (2000).
49 Miller, 523 U.S. at 468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 460.
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infant a bond of love.' O'Connor concludes, however, that this is
not enough to allow the state to require that women become moth-
ers, no matter how popular the vision of what a woman's role isi
2
O'Connor's insistence that women be allowed to decide their own fu-
ture 3 is diluted somewhat by her reference to the "bonds of love" that
presumably form between women and the children they bear. Like
the other Supreme Court references to women as mothers, this
statement associates a biological event with certain required emotions
on the part of the woman, thereby fusing together a physical event
with societal expectations of women.
These cases, while differing in their outcomes, all demonstrate the
subtle ways in which gender stereotypes can influence the Court and
Congress and, by extrapolation, our legal system as a whole. Most of
the cases cited herein involve male plaintiffs challenging custody or
citizenship statutes, many of whom argue that the statutes are based
on stereotypes of fathers. But as I will explain in the next section,
seemingly harmless gender stereotypes that are so prevalent in our
society, succeeded in infiltrating the opinions (and dissents) of the
Supreme Court whether the cases upheld or denied plaintiffs' equal
protection claims. The Court has invariably conflated the ideal of
motherhood with the idea of birth. Such confusion of sociology and
biology, while at times appearing to benefit women via better treat-
ment under custody or citizenship statutes, 4 in the end succeeds only
in perpetuating "fixed notions" of "the roles and abilities" of
55women.
In order to relieve women of such stereotypes, we must address
both the forces behind such stereotypes and their impact. In the
next Part, I make use of different feminist theorists' arguments in or-
der to accomplish this.
III. FEMINIST THEORY AND MOTHERHOOD
Feminist theory provides analytical tools with which to identify
and dissect biases within law and society; it is therefore an effective
51 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (majority
opinion).
52 Id.
53 Id. ("The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception
of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.").
54 See, e.g., Miller, 523 U.S. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("On the surface, § 1409 treats
females favorably.").
55 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
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way in which to explore the implications of the Supreme Court's lan-
guage on mothering in Nguyen. While I am aware that feminism is
not a monolith, one of its main themes-that men and women ought
to be given the same opportunities to fully exercise their citizen-
ship-is a pertinent part of my argument concerning women's per-
ceived roles in our society. While the theorists I use in my discussion
do not all share similar viewpoints within feminist theory, this theme
of opportunity for and recognition of women's citizenship is present
in their works. I believe that this is a strong enough connection to
justify grouping their theories under the general heading of "feminist
theory."
Nancy Chodorow has noted that the terms "mothering" and "fa-
thering" mean different things in our society, and that while a man
can possibly "mother" a child, it is unheard of for a woman to "father"
a child. She concludes that being a mother in our culture means
something more than the physical act of bearing a child; it also
means socializing and nurturing that child.56 In this section I will ex-
amine what I believe to be a confusion of these two roles of women,
an assumption that a biological mother is automatically and necessar-
ily a mother in the sociological sense-nurturing. Because there ex-
ists an ideal form of motherhood, and because this ideal imagines the
nurturing and caregiving we associate with motherhood to be instinc-
tual among women, women who give birth are automatically com-
pared to the ideal mother. Furthermore, because this ideal is unat-
tainable for most women, women are set up to constantly attempt and
consistently fail at modeling themselves after this ideal. The ideal
mother is also used to justify restrictions on women's liberties and
citizenship. Thus, the presumption that the biological event of birth
results in motherhood imposes society's rigid construction of ideal
motherhood on women. A woman who gives birth is expected to ad-
here to the ideals of motherhood or face the consequences (and
penalties), leaving women with children (and those without) little
room to express their citizenship as individuals. Finally, when the
Supreme Court and Congress use language that equates biological
motherhood with society's concept of motherhood-but do not do
the same for men-they are perpetuating gender stereotypes that can
harm women.
56 NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 11 (1978).
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A. Biology and Motherhood
If the tendency to nurture and care for children is instinctual
within women-a "natural" phenomenon-then it would seem to be
a short jump to the conclusion that women's bodies have been wired
for motherhood, and so all women should accept their biological des-
tiny and assume the role of nurturing mother. Because women are
biologically programmed to be mothers, men, who have no such in-
stinct, are free to choose whether or not to engage in childrearing
and nurturing since the responsibility is not theirs to bear. This the-
ory in turn supports the traditional nuclear family model.""
It is debatable whether there is any biological evidence that the
nurturing and mothering women often perform in society is instinc-
tual.5 " Those who would interpret biological data carry certain biases
into the endeavor, potentially coloring their conclusions with their
own social views.59 Even the link between a woman's "biological des-
tiny" and her physiology may not be so obvious. Mary Becker points
out that while there is concern that, if biology is destiny, "many peo-
ple will regard any subordination associated with women's traditional
roles as natural and inevitable," we do not regard other natural oc-
currences such as poor eyesight as inevitable simply because they are
natural.60
Many feminist theorists thus distinguish the sociological role of
mothering from its biological role not only because of the problem-
atic interpretation of scientific data but also because focusing solely
on biology ignores the social construction of biological factors.' Al-
57 See Richard Epstein, Gender is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 990 (1992). Epstein
claimed that the "nurturing instincts" of women
reduce the cost of doing activities that help promote the survival of both her and her off-
spring.... If nurturing brings greater pleasure or requires lower cost for women than for
men, then we should expect to see women devote a greater percentage of their resources
to it than men. This specialization ... should be accepted for what it is: a healthy adap-
tation that works for the benefit of all concerned ....
Id. at 990.
58 See CHODOROW, supra note 56, at 16, 21-22 (noting the difficulty in substantiating claims
about biological bases for sex differences in behavior, and also the difficulty in finding proof of
an instinctual or biological basis for parenting).
59 Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response to
Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1992) (explaining the empirical difficulties of
research in this area).
60 Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 133, 159 (1992).
61 See, e.g., CHODOROW, supra note 56, at 14 (rejecting the bioevolutionary theory that
women are primary now because they always have been because it ignores the "social malleabil-
ity of biological factors"); Abrams, supra note 59, at 1026 (concluding that the theory that
women's caregiving and nurturing are biologically-based ignores social structures that "grew up
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though some theorists would give more weight to the possibility that
the biological body influences, at least in part, the bond between
women and their children, 2 even they would not necessarily con-
clude that society and the law should confine women to such roles.
In fact, some, like Kathryn Baker, would argue that the law is sup-
posed to control and rectify such inequalities present in nature.6s
It is readily apparent in popular culture and law that there is
strong cultural support for the idea that biology has made mother-
hood a woman's destiny-and thus the biological and sociological
concepts of motherhood are one and the same. Why support exists
for such a theory is not as clear. Some have theorized that mothering
has taken on the meaning of both childbearing and childrearing be-
cause women usually perform both duties, so the two distinct acts are
collapsed into one term despite the fact that there is little or no evi-
dence that nature requires women to mother." Others theorists
would argue that a more invidious reason lies behind the fact that the
term "mother" tends to mean both the biological event of birth and
the social role of caretaking; men, who have the power to shape such
roles, do not want to participate in raising children and thus assign
that responsibility to women.
to reinforce women's restriction to these tasks," such as the belief that childcare is women's
work).
62 See Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, in FEMINIST SOCIAL THOUGHT 584, 587 (Diana Tiet-
jens Meyers ed., 1997) ("I do not wish to deny any more than I wish to affirm some biological
bases of maternal thinking. The 'biological body' (in part a cultural artifact) may foster certain
features of maternal practice, sensibility, and thought.") (emphasis in original).
63 See Baker, supra note 6, at 805-6.
64 See Abrams, supra note 59, at 1022 (noting that arguments "tracing socially observable dif-
ferences to, or basing social and familial roles on, accounts of biological differentiation" are
prevalent in our society); Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1049 (1992) ("[T]here remains a common residue of meaning that seems affixed, as if by
nature, to the female body. Law participates in creating that meaning."); Lisa C. Ikemoto, The
In/fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1024 (1996) ("We rarely think
about the legal basis for motherhood. The fact that a woman gives birth to a child makes the
woman's status as mother seem obvious.").
65 See generally M.M. Slaughter, The Legal Construction of "Mother," in MOTHERS IN LAW:
FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 73 (Martha Albertson Fine-
man & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (discussing the role of childrearing inherent in the concept of
"mother").
66 See, e.g., M. Rivka Polatnick, Why Men Don't Rear Children: A Power Analysis (1983), reprinted
in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 704 (Mary Becker et al. eds., 2d ed.
2001):
[M]en (as a group) don't rear children because they don't want to rear children. (This
implies, of course, that they are in a position to enforce their preferences.) It is to men's
advantage that women are assigned childrearing responsibility, and it is in men's interest
to keep things that way.
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This latter reasoning for the confusion of biological fact and so-
ciological norm is supported by society's construction of the "ideal"
mother. This ideal, analyzed in the next section, perpetuates tradi-
tional parenting and gender roles of mother and father. It also has
the effect of alienating and marginalizing many women, both with
and without children, because of its rigid definition of what a mother
should (and should not) be.
B. The Ideal Mother
The notion of the "ideal" mother is rooted in the aforementioned
idea of biological destiny and is prevalent in our society. Patrice
DiQuinzio refers to this ideal as "essential motherhood":
According to essential motherhood, mothering is a function of women's
essentially female nature, women's biological reproductive capacities ....
It requires women's exclusive and selfless attention to and care of chil-
dren based on women's psychological and emotional capacities for em-
pathy, awareness of the needs of others, and self-sacrifice. According to
essential motherhood.., women's desires are oriented to mothering and
women's psychological development and emotional satisfaction require
mothering.
According to this ideal, the mother should feel an immediate and
intense emotional bond with her child, despite the reality that not all
women feel passionate about their babies and indeed may not feel
any intense emotions immediately."' Besides self-sacrifice and devo-
tion, the ideal mother standard requires the impossible from some
women; in popular culture, the best mothers are white, heterosexual,
financially secure, and married. 9 Thus, poor women, single women,
lesbians and women of color are further marginalized by society;
while some women are permitted to model themselves after the ideal,
these women are never allowed to be viewed as ideal mother material.
The consequences of this restrictive and racist ideology are discussed
later.
See also Becker, supra note 60, at 159 ("[I]f biology is destiny, many people will regard any sub-
ordination associated with women's traditional roles as natural and inevitable.").
67 PATRICE DIQUINZIO, THE IMPOSSIBILI'IY OF MOTHERHOOD: FEMINISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND
THE PROBLEM OF MOTHERING xiii (1999).
68 Becker, supra note 60, at 143. See also DIQUINZIO, supra note 67, at 89 (stating that women
are expected "to have a certain bond with or connection to the children to whom they give
birth").
6,) April L. Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial Subordination, Gestational
Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood, 10 TEX.J. WOMEN & L. 83, 98-99 (2001).
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The ideology of motherhood places an inordinate amount of
pressure on women to have and care for children. This ideology pos-
its not only that all women should want to be mothers70 (because it is
their biological destiny), but that perhaps females do not even be-
come women until they experience the physical event of childbirth.7'
DiQuinzio maintains that "the fact that women play a specific role in
the physical reproduction of the species means that to be a woman is
to fulfill this role. 7 2 This assumption that all women should want to
bear children and that childbearing is an essential part of a woman's
identity has even permeated the medical world, potentially impacting
women's medical decisions. Paula Nicholson, who has analyzed post-
natal depression, explains that motherhood becomes a public ex-
perience through a woman's interaction with experts such as doctors,
social workers, and psychologists during pregnancy, labor, childbirth
and childrearing. Within these interactions, such experts "prescribe
the motherhood role with impunity and apparently without ques-
tion," the consequence being that "discourses surrounding childbirth
and motherhood position the role of 'mother' as biological and im-
mutable. Childbirth and motherhood, exclusively the function of the
female body, in both a physical and social sense, are seen to be natu-
ral for women.
73
The influence of science upon the imposition of the role of
motherhood, and vice versa, is not merely coincidental. American
society is pronatalist in that it encourages childbearing.4 Thus, hav-
ing professionals in the medical and social sciences reinforce the no-
tion that women should want to be mothers furthers this goal of
childbearing and rearing.75 This unflagging support for childrearing,
coupled with the aforementioned idea that women should be respon-
sible for that childbearing, maintains our western industrial capitalist
society.76 When the traditional model of family life is followed, the
man (or husband) is free to pursue economically productive activi-
70 DIQuINZIO, supra note 67, at 89.
71 But see Cherry, supra note 69, at 98 n.63 (noting that some black feminist critiques of
motherhood suggest that, for some women in the African-American community, having a child
is considered a symbol of adulthood).
72 DIQuINZIO, supra note 67, at 89.
73 PAULA NICHOLSON, POST-NATAL DEPRESSION: PSYCHOLOGY, SCIENCE AND THE TRANSITION
TO MOTHERHOOD 1 (1998).
74 CONSTANCE L. SHEHAN & KENNETH C.W. KAMMEYER, MARRIAGES AND FAMILIES:
REFLECTIONS OF A GENDERED SOCIETY 187 (1997).
75 However, American society only encourages certain kinds of childbearing and rearing:
ideally, white children born to married couples who are economically self-sufficient. See infra
Part III (discussing the contours of ideal motherhood).
76 DIQUINZIO, supra note 67, at viii.
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ties, such as a full-time job, while the woman (or wife) is relegated to
the home to care for the children. Indeed, Elizabeth Iglesias con-
tends that a mother who attempts economic autonomy or any other
kind of independence is perceived as selfishly neglecting her chil-
dren, while no such stigma is attached to a father's quest for similar
ends." The ideals of motherhood are thus deeply rooted in the struc-
ture of our society. It is no wonder that these ideals, as previously
noted, seep into the opinions of our nation's highest court.
Even the act of giving birth can be perceived as symbolic of wom-
anhood. In modern society, more women have more choices before
them in terms of career development and economic advancement.
Women who are fortunate enough to have these choices may still opt
to create a family. Due to external pressures, though, such women
often lack the time to undertake the duties of the perfect mother,
such as round-the-clock childcare.' Some argue that because more
women are diversifying their time and energies into more activities
than full-time childcare alone, the event of birth itself has become
"the socially and biologically quintessential womanly act; "79 it embod-
ies who and what a woman is. The result is that a purely biological
event-childbirth-is cloaked in notions of femininity and is por-
trayed as a goal for which American women should strive. Childbirth
becomes shorthand for the fulfillment of a woman's role in society.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine when the
ideology of motherhood came into existence," it is critical to under-
stand how our society-including our legal system-has readily
adopted and perpetuated this concept. The reality of the situation is
that women's ability to influence the concept of motherhood and its
duties is extremely limited; men have traditionally held the power to
define the roles of both women and children." According to Adrien
77 Elizabeth Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power,
and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REv. 869, 914-15 (1996).
78 See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT (1989) (surveying case studies on
women who, because of societal presumptions of who should perform the housework and
childcare, must deal with the friction created when women choose to both work and have a
family); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND (1997) (analyzing the creation of time for both
work and family in modern American society).
79 SUSAN MAUSHART, THE MASK OF MOTHERHOOD: How BECOMING A MOTHER CHANGES
EVERYrHING AND WHY WE PRETEND IT DOESN'T 70 (1999) (quoting sociologists Mira Crouch
and Lenore Manderson).
80 SeeAdrien Katherine Wing & Laura Weselmann, Transcending Traditional Notions of Mother-
ing: The Need for Critical Race Feminist Praxis, 3J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 257 (1999) (stating that in
Western culture, ideals of motherhood date back to Judeo-Christian tradition with its images of
Eve and the Virgin Mary).
81 NICHOLSON, supra note 73, at 8.
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Katherine Wing and Laura Weselmann in their analysis of images of
mothers, motherhood is not only presented as the natural destiny for
all women, but definitions of motherhood "are further shaped by
public and private expectations, which are socially and culturally en-
forced."82 Furthermore, as April Cherry argues, because motherhood
is shaped by men and patriarchal norms, women do not own the in-
stitution of motherhood. Instead, "[t]ihe meaning of motherhood for
women has been created largely in response to having the institution
forced upon them. 83
Indeed, assumptions about motherhood are continually rein-
forced by our legal system. Martha Fineman argues that this is be-
cause motherhood is a "colonized category" in law, one "initially de-
fined, controlled, and given legal content by men."84  The very
structure of our legal system legitimizes the male-defined category of
motherhood. Fineman notes that law as an institution "was con-
structed at a time when women were systematically excluded from
participation." '85 Thus, for the "colonized categor[y]" of motherhood,
"[m]ale norms and male understandings fashioned legal definitions
of what constituted a family, of what was good mothering, who had
claims and access to children as well as to jobs and education, and,
ultimately, how legal institutions functioned to give or deny redress
for alleged (and defined) harms. 86 Thus, the imagery and expecta-
tions of motherhood, controlled by those in power, perpetuate gen-
der inequalities in our legal system and maintain the "social, eco-
nomic, and political power in the hands of White men."87
Any discussion of an ideal mother raises the question of who is the
non-ideal mother. As mentioned earlier, I believe that the ideal
mother is an impossible standard for any woman to reach. However,
certain groups of women are further disadvantaged because society
labels them "bad mothers" from the start. Those who do not (or can-
not) conform to the ideal image of motherhood are categorized as
"deviant" mothers by Martha Fineman; such mothers include women
who work, poor women, and unmarried women. Non-white womenare also branded as bad mothers.8" April Cherry contends that
8 Wing & Weselmann, supra note 80, at 257.
83 Cherry, supra note 69, at 91.
84 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 38 (1995).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Cherry, supra note 69, at 91.
8 FINEMAN, supra note 84, at 101.
89 Cherry, supra note 69, at 85.
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that motherhood requires chastity and sexual modesty, traits that
white hegemonic culture have not traditionally offered to African-
American women.90 Along these same lines of marginalization, single
women are characterized as being selfish for wanting children ' and
are also blamed for such societal ills as crime and poverty.' Unmar-
ried African-American women with children are often viewed as
flawed individuals with "inherent character weaknesses"93 for having
children in situations contradictory to that prescribed by society. As a
group, however, white single women with children are generally not
demeaned or blamed in the same way."'
From this characterization of certain groups of women, it is evi-
dent that the ideology of motherhood sets up a hierarchy, casting
women who do not conform to the ideal into lower, less-respected
roles, in effect punishing them for their inability or refusal to meet
the demands of society. In fact, Patrice DiQuinzio maintains that
such deviant women, along with women who refuse to mother, are
considered "deficient as women."""
The legal implications for stereotypes of motherhood, then, are
grave indeed; the construct of legal rights depends upon lawmakers'
ideas of individuals' societal roles, and so rights and remedies avail-
able to women can depend on lawmakers' views of who is an ideal
mother. The impact that societal norms can have on administrators
and judges is also critical, since such norms may influence their deci-
sions in particular cases. For instance, an unmarried woman seeking
citizenship for her nonmarital children in a situation similar to
Nguyen might face her own uphill battle against preconceived notions
of what a mother is because she does not have the husband and tradi-
tional familial structure that society expects and rewards.
Those who do not fit into society's "norm" of who should be a
mother are thereby deprived of the benefits and protections that laws
can provide. When a legislature-local, state or federal-conflates a
woman's biological function-such as birth-with the expectation of
motherhood, this can only heighten the potential harm for women,
because such assumptions confuse social expectations with physio-
logical events. By incorporating such assumptions into our laws, the
90 Id. at 108.
91 Ikernoto, supra note 64, at 1050-52.
92 Cherry, supra note 69, at 103-04.
93 Ikemoto, supra note 64, at 1047.
94 Id.
95 DIQUINZIO, supra note 67, at xiii.
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legal system succeeds in perpetuating "conventional gender ideol-
"96
ogy.
In the next section, I will explore the possible implications of this
conflation of biology with societal norms, and the impact that the
language in the Nguyen might have.
C. Implications of Ideal Motherhood and the Nguyen Decision
The implications of comparing women to the ideal mother (or
the standard of the bad mother) are far-reaching. Generally, the ide-
als of motherhood are used to punish women or, more accurately, to
use them as scapegoats. For instance, the presumption is that the
maternal instinct is inherent in all women or, more accurately, in
women who should be mothers. According to Paula Nicholson, the
absence of this maternal instinct can then be used to explain
"women's maternal failures, such as not protecting children from or
perpetuating child abuse or neglect."9 7 This is the other side of the
proverbial coin; not only does the construction of an ideal mother re-
lieve men of the responsibilities of caring for children by correlating
motherhood with childbirth, but this ideal can be wielded against
women as well as punishment for their perceived shortcomings in the
prescribed role of mother.
In the area of criminal law, prosecutors and defense attorneys rely
on the dichotomy of good/bad mother (or, even more telling, "mon-
ster/mother") in their portrayals of female defendants who have
abused or killed their children. 8 Such a dichotomy establishes
heightened standards of appropriate conduct for women who have
children that might be used by the jury and public in their judgment
of such defendants, standards that society would not hold to men
with children. 9 Even attorneys representing women accused of child
abuse can be affected by the concept of the "bad mother,"190 which
96 Wing & Weselmann, supra note 80, at 266.
97 NICHOLSON, supra note 73, at 14. See also Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 375, 377 (1996) (discussing the significance of mother-child bonds and the fact that
mothers who unnecessarily break that bond-via separation from the child-"are regarded as
misguided, selfish, unnatural").
See Chimene I. Keitner, Victim or Vamp? Images of Violent Women in the CriminalJustice System,
11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 38, 47 (2002) (stating that the district attorney in a particular case
said that the defendant mother "was going to be held up to our community as a monster.")
(quoting Patrick May, Florida Woman Sentenced to Die for Torture-Murder of Son, BALT. SUN, Apr. 2,
1992, at 3A).
99 Id. at 47.
100 See Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1017-18 (1992) (describing how other practitioners and law students find
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can have potential adverse effects on their ability to adequately and
competently represent such clients.
In the context of child custody disputes, the effect of this ideology
is again to hold women more responsible for the welfare of their
children than fathers. Because judges continue to impose or approve
child custody and support plans in which women have more physical
responsibility for child care than men, Mary Joe Frug concludes that"the administration of domestic relations law is implicated in helping
or making women 'mother' their children..... The ideal mother
functions in the ideal family: a nuclear family, headed by married
parents. In reality, however, many African-American and Latina
women, who are often unmarried, raise their children with the sup-
port of extended "matrifocal" families. °2 Because such families do
not conform to the ideal, the women who head them are penalized
by the state; for instance, welfare eligibility rules do not fully recog-
nize such family units, making it difficult for such women to receive
economic aid. 0
So pervasive is this ideal image of mother that, even if a woman
does not experience direct blame for her mothering, she may still be
susceptible to experiencing a sense of failure. Women who are not
mothers can be viewed by society as unfeminine, and their achieve-
ments made outside of motherhood "are condemned within patriar-
chy as substitutes for normal femininity." 0 4 The proper sphere for
women to exercise any influence, according to the popular view, is
exclusively motherhood. 10 The stigma attached to bad mothering
thus can extend to women who are not mothers because they have
failed to use their bodies for their expected role.
With respect to the event of childbirth, researchers have found
that a significant number of women have negative reactions immedi-
ately after giving birth; 0 this may be due to the fact that such women
were led to believe that childbirth would be easier than it was in real-
women accused of abuse or neglect "morally abject," and how the author has attempted to use
literature to "facilitate a more sympathetic approach to these clients").
10 Frug, supra note 64, at 1060. But see Baker, supra note 6, at 822 (claiming that because
women must expend more of physiological resources in order to have children, the law should
reflect the larger investment of women, and should not presume that both parents are equally
fit to take care of the child).
102 Iglesias, supra note 77, at 929.
103 Id.
104 NICHOLSON, supra note 73, at 7.
105 Cherry, supra note 69, at 99.
106 SHEHAN & KAMMEYER, supra note 74, at 193 (referring to a study done by Entwistle and
Doering in 1981).
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ity."' 7 The perpetually positive spin placed on motherhood and the
reluctance to disclose the truth of many women's situations-the
physical pain, the emotional challenges, the lack of support-does an
injustice to women who do elect to have children because, at the very
least, such high expectations unnecessarily set such women up for
disappointment. In stronger terms, the ideals of motherhood can
deceive women into believing that not only should they become
mothers (because it a biological imperative), but that such a role will
be supported by society. Often times, as noted earlier, this is far from
reality; many women with children are marginalized or even ignored
by the state and society.
Reproductive freedoms and privacy may be the most affected by
this ideology. When motherhood is perceived as the societal norm,
as I have discussed above, the expectation is that all women should
embrace the role of mother. This expectation, in turn, can be used
to justify restrictions on abortion. Reva Siegel has argued that one of
the objectives, if not the objective, of abortion regulation "is to force
women to assume the role and perform the work that has tradition-
ally defined their secondary social status," namely, motherhood.'O
t
She later elaborates on this possible ulterior motive of lawmakers:
[L] egislators enacting restrictions on abortion may act from judgments
about the sexual and maternal conduct of the women they are regulat-
ing; and not merely from a concern about the welfare of the unborn.
Legislators may condemn abortion because they assume that any preg-
nant woman who does not wish to be pregnant has committed some sex-
ual indiscretion properly punishable by compelling pregnancy itself.
1
o
9
This tendency to punish pregnant women for not adhering to soci-
ety's standards can invade all aspects of a woman's privacy. Dorothy
Roberts contends that government requirements for administering
and reporting drug tests of pregnant women is a way for the govern-
ment to criminalize the mother "as a consequence of her decision to
bear a child."'10 This is especially problematic because of the racial
bias of the reporting; such policies in effect target poor women of
color, who are most likely to be under government supervision in the
first place, and thus are more likely to be reported."' Even the deci-
sion to become a mother can be adversely affected. Because child-
107 Id. at 191,193.
108 Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Ques-
tions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 358 (1992).
109 Id. at 361.
110 Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1432 (1991).
III Id.
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lessness is so often equated with failure, it is difficult to say that
women are freely exercising their reproductive freedom when they
choose to become mothers. 
2
When the government makes policy decisions or legal judgments
based on stereotypes of women as inevitable mothers, it does a disser-
vice to its female citizens because it circumscribes what constitutes
appropriate conduct by women. In contrast, any governmental reli-
ance on stereotypes of men as fathers does not have the equivalent
adverse effect on men's citizenship because these stereotypes do not
assume that all men are inherently fathers."3 When a court, such as
the Nguyen court, expects women to be nurturing and "maternal"
upon the birth of a child, such presumptions are based on traits as-
signed to women by a patriarchal society and not necessarily on any
instinct or biological predisposition. These characterizations of
women as nurturers perpetuate gender stereotypes and traditional
familial roles to the detriment of women. Having established, at least
in part, the broad scope of women's rights affected by stereotypes of
motherhood, in the next Part I address the possibility of a woman
challenging Section 1409 on equal protection grounds.
IV. POTENTIAL EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION UNDER SECTION
1409 (A) 4 FOR WOMEN
As mentioned earlier in discussing Ginsburg's dissent in Miller,
Section 1409 seems on its face to benefit women; "there are far fewer
obstacles for a citizen mother to surmount in order to establish the
citizenship of her non-marital child born outside the United States
than there are for a citizen father in the same situation." 5 The citizen
112 Cherry, supra note 69, at 94.
13 In fact, it would seem that the government presumes that men are not fathers, as evi-
denced by the stringent requirements of Section 1409 for children born abroad to citizen fa-
thers, thus initially freeing a man from the gendered role of father until further evidence estab-
lishes him as such. And although men who do challenge society's relatively low expectations of
fathers can experience the same negative economic consequences as mothers, a father's duties
to his children, his presence (or absence) in a household, and his decision to have children do
not draw the same attention nor impose the same kind of expectations that burden a similarly
situated woman. For a discussion of how fathers may experience the same negative economic
consequences as mothers, see Martha Albertson Fineman, Commentary: Why Marriage?, 9 VA.J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 239, 256 (2001) (noting that although "the assumption of responsibilities for
children and other dependents continues to be gender-skewed" and that "[t]he implications of
motherhood are very different from those of fatherhood," studies show that when men attempt
to redefine "society's expectations for fathers" they can "suffer some of the same disadvantages
and negative economic consequences as mothers").
14 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
115 See8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2002).
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mother does not have to establish a maternal link to the child in the
way that a citizen father must under Section 1409(a) (4). So long as
the mother has United States citizenship at the time her child is
born116 and has lived in this country continuously for at least one
year,"' her child will also receive United States citizenship."" Contrast
this with the burdensome provisions of Section 1409(a), which re-
quire a father seeking similar citizenship for his child to show proof
of a blood relationship between himself and the child, to agree in
writing to provide financial support for the child until he or she is
eighteen years old, and, at issue in Nguyen,"" to legitimate the child
under local law, acknowledge paternity in writing under oath, or es-
tablish paternity by adjudication in court.' Clearly, the require-
ments for a citizen mother are less burdensome, and thus the statute
seems to benefit women more than men.
However, both Congress and the Supreme Court implicitly (and,
at times, explicitly) rely on the aforementioned stereotypical notions
of motherhood to achieve this supposed "benefit" for women under
Section 1409. As mentioned above, a statute containing a sex-based
classification is subjected to heightened scrutiny, meaning that the
statute must serve important governmental objectives and the means
used must be "substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives." 12 ' According to the Hogan Court, the real governmental pur-
pose behind the unequal treatment cannot rest upon stereotypes; the
heightened standard "must be applied free of fixed notions concern-
ing the roles and abilities of males and females."
22
The majority in Nguyen bypassed this discussion of stereotypes be-
cause they found that the government's interest in ensuring that the
child and citizen parent have an opportunity to develop both a legal
relationship and everyday ties was indeed important and that the dif-
ferential treatment supported that objective. r Because a man is not
biologically required to be present at birth as a woman is, the Court
found that the extra burden the government imposed on fathers was
substantially related to the government's interest in seeing a real rela-
116 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2).
"1 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c). Note that a citizen mother may also meet the requirement by living
for at least one continuous year in one of the outlying possessions of the United States. Id.
118 Id.
19 See Nguyen, 533 U.S at 59-60.
120 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2002).
121 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut.
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
122 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
123 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65.
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tionship develop between father and child.14 Once the Court substi-
tuted the event of birth for an opportunity for a woman and child to
bond, upholding the statute was almost inevitable since legislation
that differentiates its treatment on biological or physical differences
is not subject to heightened scrutiny.115
The dissent also made note of the majority's approach, as dis-
cussed in the first section of this paper, and concluded that using the
woman's inevitable presence at the birth as justification for differen-
tial treatment was based on an overbroad generalization about gen-
der roles.2 6 While the dissent was concerned with examining how a
generalization that mothers are more likely than fathers to develop
relationships with their children would negatively affect men, 7 I am
arguing that this generalization has an equally negative impact on
women. I would extend the dissent's arguments to incorporate the
statute's potentially adverse effects on women's equal protection
rights. Presuming that women will bond with their children simply
because there is a biological tie between them places an enormous
pressure on women to become mothers and conform to societal ex-
pectations; there is no such pressure on men to become fathers de-
spite their own biological ties to children. The majority's analysis in
Nguyen thus selectively relies on biology to justify upholding Section
1409.
The biggest criticism of such an argument is that its basis is too at-
tenuated; the language of the case and of the statute does not on its
face presume that all women are mothers, or should be mothers.
However, when applying heightened scrutiny in equal protection
cases, a court examines the actual purpose of the legislature, not
merely its stated purpose. The Nguyen dissent details the history of
child custody and immigration laws in America and concludes that
the present laws were founded on laws that discriminated heavily
against women and that this history should counsel the Court in its
analysis of the actual legislative purpose in the present case. 9 This
examination of legal history sheds light on burdens that the law has
imposed on women; women were viewed as the "natural guardian" of
124 See id.
125 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 ("[T]he two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community composed of both.") (quoting Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (alteration in original)).
126 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 89.
128 See id. at 75 ("[A] justification that sustains a sex-based classification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.") (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533).
1'2 Id. at 91-92.
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children and consequently men were freed from the duty to care for
children since the duty was naturally the mother's. 3 0 The assumption
that birth invokes the ideals of motherhood within women rests on
similar discriminatory notions. Additionally, the mere fact that dis-
crimination seems to benefit women does not mean that an equal
protection challenge brought by a woman will fail. As mentioned in
the Nguyen dissent, it does not matter whether the generalizations for
the sex-based classification shows disrespect for one class; all that
matters is whether it uses gender as a "proxy for other, more germane
bases of classification.' ' 31  Thus, a challenge brought by a woman
against Section 1409 could stand because the classification in the
statute arguably relies on stereotypes of parental roles. Even if it is
debatable whether a woman citizen would actually raise such a claim
against this seemingly beneficial statute, from a theoretical stand-
point there is no question that the effects of such gender stereotyping
are potentially harmful to any woman. It is therefore important to
examine the legal arguments available to women who wish to chal-
lenge the differential treatment of Section 1409.
CONCLUSION
It is important to stress that the point of this analysis is not to de-
prive women of the rights and privileges they do have under the law;
it certainly would seem that attacking a statute that gives women an
advantage in establishing citizenship for their children would be con-
trary to that principle. However, the underlying presumptions that
have given women beneficial treatment under that law must be exam-
ined. Here, these presumptions seem to only harm women in the
long run. By expecting women to become mothers in a sociological
sense, merely because they have become mothers, in a biological
sense, at the time of birth, the government is compelling women to
fulfill the sociological role of motherhood. Reva Siegel writes that
"[w]hen the state deprives women of choice in matters of mother-
hood, it deprives women of the ability to lead their lives with some
rudimentary control over the sex-role constraints this society imposes
on those who bear and rear children.' ' 13 2 Thus, Section 1409's un-
equal treatment and its presupposition that women will bond with
130 Id.
131 Id. at 90 (referring to language in Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 198 (1976)).
132 Siegel, supra note 108, at 378.
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children at birth perpetuates the antiquated idea that women, exclu-
sively, should be the primary caretakers.
Neglecting to combat these stereotypes and to legally distinguish
between women's biological functions and society's expectations of
women can result in more policies and legislation that limit women's
full participation as citizens in this country; the adverse implications
of motherhood stereotypes range from restrictive abortion regula-
tions to condemning women of color and poor women for having
children at all. The argument that was ultimately accepted in
Nguyen-that a real opportunity exists at birth for a woman to bond
with her child-seems to be driven by an insistence that women
should readily bond with their children, and will be categorized, both
in the law and in society at large, as unfit or deviant if they do not.
While it is true that women seemingly benefit from the provisions
of Section 1409 (at least in contrast to their male counterparts), the
price that women must pay for such advantageous treatment is too
high. When we as a society presume that women who become bio-
logical mothers will immediately transform into nurturers and care-
takers, we give women little choice but to function within society's
gender-biased paradigm of parenthood. Such women are destined to
continually strive to meet society's standards of what a mother ought
to be (lest they be faced with the consequences of nonconformity),
and to most likely fail, in one way or another, in their attempts to be-
come the ideal mother.
Motherhood can be empowering 3 and fulfilling, but it can also
be isolating, especially for women who do not or cannot conform to
what society views as the model mother. While I believe the law
should reflect the vast contributions women make by raising chil-
dren,3 I also believe that in deciding to participate in the cultural in-
stitution of motherhood, women must be allowed to exercise their
choice free from the constraints and impossible expectations of soci-
ety.
133 See Ruddick, supra note 62, at 585 (discussing the power a woman has in deciding to have
children and in deciding how to raise them).
I See, e.g., Becker, supra note 60, at 139 (advocating a "maternal deference standard" in child
custody cases, which would have judges "defer to fit the mother's judgment of the custodial ar-
rangement that would be best") (emphasis in original).
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